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The Souring of Sweet Acidophilus Milk: Speck v. North
Carolina Dairy Foundation and the Rights of
University Faculty to Their Inventive Ideas
Although universities and university faculty have litigated many cases con-
cerning patent rights,1 cases deciding the respective rights of the faculty inventor
and the university are few.2 The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed this
issue in Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Foundation.3 The court held that univer-
sity faculty employed as "teachers and researchers" 4 fall within the category of
persons "hired to invent" and thus have no right to or interest in inventions
arising from university research. 5
This Note analyzes the development of the common-law rights of employ-
ees to their inventive ideas and the Speck court's failure to delineate the rights of
university employees within this established framework. The Note concludes
that the court's classification of university faculty as persons hired to invent is
contrary to the premises upon which higher education is based.
Traditionally, in the absence of an express contract, the rights of employees
to their inventions have depended upon the nature of the employment. If the
employee was hired to invent, the employer was entitled to full property rights
1. See Mead Corp. v. United States, 652 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (Dr. Richard
Sweet, a research scientist at Stanford University, developed an ink-jet device pursuant to a contract
between the university and the Department of Defense. Sweet then conveyed all his rights to A.B.
Dick Co. as allowed by his contract with Stanford. Mead Corp. was unsuccessful in its attempts to
force the government to recognize that the Department of Defense had acquired all interests in the
patent.); Burns v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 394 F.2d 416 (1st Cir. 1968) (Burns informed
the university of certain secret ideas so that the university could access those ideas and furnish an
opinion as to their usefulness to an agency of the United States. Burns alleged that the university
presented an unfavorable report but proceeded to develop those ideas. The court held the statute of
limitations for torts governed and dismissed the action.); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin
Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.) (Dr. Steenbock of the University of Wisconsin
had developed a process for the production of Vitamin D from lipoid contained in milk and other
food products. The court held that plaintiff's failure to authorize the use of this process by the
margarine industry was against the public interest. An infringement action against defendant there-
fore was dismissed. Dr. Steenbock had received $760,000 in royalties at the time of the action.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945); Dinwiddie v. St. Louis & O'Fallon Coal Co., 64 F.2d 303 (4th Cir.
1933) (Dr. Harrison Bashioum, head of the Chemical Engineering Department of the University of
Pittsburgh, and others were denied all rights to patents pertaining to coal products that had been
developed under the employment of defendant.); Powell Mfg. Co. v. Long Mfg. Co., 319 F. Supp. 24
(E.D.N.C. 1970) (Dr. Francis Hassler, a professor at North Carolina State College, obtained patents
relating to the bulk-curing of tobacco. These patents were assigned to Powell Manufacturing. In an
infringement suit, the court held that Hassler's connection to the college did not create a dedication
to the public.); Simmons v. California Inst. of Technology, 34 Cal. 2d 264, 209 P.2d 581 (1949) (en
bane) (Edward Simmons, a student at the California Institute of Technology, developed a strain
sensitive element that was used in research conducted by a faculty member. The court allowed
Simmons to rescind a contract to convey an interest in the device because of fraud.); Blackwell,
Avoiding Litigation over Faculty Patents, 1950-51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS OF COLLEGES AND
UNivERsmas 21 (Dr. Albert Schatz, assistant professor at Brooklyn College, claimed he was codis-
coverer of streptomycin along with Dr. Selman Waksman of Rutgers University. The Superior
Court of New Jersey accepted a settlement between the two.)
2. T. BLACKWELL, COLLEGE LAW: A GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS 175 (1961).
3. 311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
4. Id. at 686, 319 S.E.2d at 143.
5. Id.
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in the invention. If the invention was created during hours of employment with
the employer's materials, the employee retained the right to the inventive idea,
subject to the employer's shop right-a nonexclusive right to use the invention
in the employer's business. If the employee was not hired to invent and the
invention was developed without the aid of the employer's resources, the em-
ployee retained full title to the invention.
6
In 1970 Dr. Marvin Speck, a professor at North Carolina State University
(NCSU), began working on the development of a pleasant-tasting milk contain-
ing lactobacillus acidophilus.7 Lactobacillus acidophilus is a bacteria that facili-
tates proper digestion by neutralizing various undesirable microorganisms in the
human intestines. 8 While an employee of NCSU, Speck, with the assistance of
Dr. Stanley Gilliland, developed an improved medium for growing lactobacillus
acidophilus.9
Speck informed his department chairman, Dr. William Roberts, of this dis-
covery and noted that it would make possible the mass marketing of milk con-
taining such bacteria.10 In September 1972 Speck sent a memo to the
department head stating that "there would appear to be nothing sufficiently
novel to warrant the filing of a patent application on this product. . . ." 11 In-
stead, Speck suggested that NCSU pursue registration of a trademark and pro-
ceed to market milk containing lactobacillus acidophilus. Speck then submitted
a proposal to the University's Patent Committee' 2 that the North Carolina
Dairy Foundation, 13 a nonprofit organization closely tied to NCSU, pursue li-
censing of a trademark. 14
6. See infra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
7. Speck, 311 N.C. at 680, 319 S.E.2d at 140.
8. Plaintiff-Appellees' New Brief at 1, Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Found., 311 N.C. 679,
319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
9. Defendant-Appellants' New Brief (Board of Governors, et al.) at 2, Speck v. North Caro-
lina Dairy Found., 311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
10. Speck, 311 N.C. at 681-82, 319 S.E.2d at 141.
11. Defendant-Appellants' New Brief (Board of Governors, et al.) at 2, Speck v. North Caro-
lina Dairy Found., 311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
12. North Carolina State University (NCSU) is one of 16 constituent universities that comprise
the University of North Carolina (UNC) system; this system is administered by the Board of Gover-
nors. N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 116-4, -11 (1983 & Supp. 1984). The UNC Board of Governors adopted a
patent policy that provides for the establishment of a patent committee at each constituent univer-
sity. Such committees are responsible for reviewing "all patent disclosures made by the faculty and
staff.. . [and resolving] questions of invention ownership that may arise between the institution and
its faculty. . . ." University of North Carolina Patent Policy 10 (Nov. 16, 1973) (available from
the University of North Carolina General Administration Office).
13. The Dairy Foundation is a nonprofit organization that promotes University research
on dairy products. It has its office on the University campus and one of its officers is a dean
at the University. Dr. Speck and University officials helped the Dairy Foundation negoti-
ate a contract for commercial production of acidophilus. The Dairy Foundation's Aci-
dophilus Committee minutes of 9 January 1973 stated that University officials "would be
kept informed of all pending actions and would be given the opportunity to review all
agreements and contracts prior to execution." The Patent Committee and ranking Univer-
sity officials consistently maintained their desire to "work through" the Dairy Foundation
to make Sweet Acidophilus milk a commercially viable product.
Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Found., 64 N.C. App. 419, 421, 307 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1983), rev'd,
311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
14. University of North Carolina Patent Policy, supra note 12, provides that the inventor shall
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In 1975 Speck wrote to Roberts to inform him that the royalty rights of
Speck and Gilliland had been overlooked in the Dairy Foundation's marketing
of Sweet Acidophilus milk. 15 A legal advisor to NCSU responded, asserting
that Speck had no claim to any such royalties. 16 Although the Chairman of the
University's Patent Committee previously had recommended that the University
make a one-time payment of fifteen percent of the royalties to plaintiffs to avoid
"hard feelings" within the Department, 17 Speck and Gilliland had received no
compensation, other than salaries, for this development. In 1981 Speck and Gil-
liland sued NCSU and the North Carolina Dairy Foundation. 18
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground
that the three-year statute of limitations for implied contracts barred any action
for recovery of royalties. 19 The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that if a special confidence existed between plaintiffs and NCSU, a
breach of this fiduciary relationship would result in a constructive trust that
triggered the ten-year statute of limitations. The court also rejected the North
Carolina Dairy Foundation's contention that the action should be barred on a
waiver and abandonment theory.20 Whether a fiduciary relationship existed and
whether plaintiffs' actions should be barred by waiver and abandonment were
deemed issues for the jury.
2 1
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that to prove a constructive trust
plaintiffs would have to prove a property interest in the secret process: "If the
plaintiffs never had any interest in the process which they developed while em-
ployed by the University, the defendants did not stand in a fiduciary relationship
receive not less than 15% of the gross royalties from licensing a patent. As noted by the North
Carolina Supreme Court: "The written Patent Policy adopted on November 16, 1973 by the defend-
ant, The Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina, simply was silent as to trademarks
and trade secrets." Speck, 311 N.C. at 687, 319 S.E.2d at 144. The North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals had stated, "the Patent Committee revised the policy in 1976 to expressly cover trademarks
and trade secret agreements." Speck, 64 N.C. App. at 421, 307 S.E.2d at 787, rev'd, 311 N.C. 679,
319 S.E.2d 139 (1984). The supreme court rebutted this statement: "There is no indication in the
record on appeal that the defendant Board of Governors has ever authorized or approved an amend-
ment to its written Patent Policy in any way to cover trademarks and trade secrets." Speck, 311
N.C. at 687, 319 S.E.2d at 144. The UNC Patent and Copyright policies as adopted by the Board of
Governors in June 1983 specifically state that the issuance of a trademark in the name of the Univer-
sity shall not result in royalties to the individual developing the trademark. University of North
Carolina Patent and Copyright Policies 14-15 (June 1983) (available from the University of North
Carolina General Administration Office). The policy denounces trade secret agreements as being
inconsistent with the goals of the University. Id. at 15.
15. Speck, 311 N.C. at 684, 319 S.E.2d at 142.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 684-85, 319 S.E.2d at 142-43.
18. Id. at 685, 319 S.E.2d at 143.
19. Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Found., 64 N.C. App. 419,422, 307 S.E.2d 785, 788 (1983),
rev'd, 311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
20. The North Carolina Dairy Foundation argued: "[An employee is not entitled to compen-
sation. . . for the use of his invention, where in express terms the employee has given his employer
the free use of his invention or by his conduct or actions has manifested his acquiesence in its use
without payment therefor." Defendant-Appellee's Brief (N.C. Dairy Foundation, Inc.) at 15, Speck
v. North Carolina Dairy Found., 64 N.C. App. 419, 307 S.E.2d 785 (1983), rev'd, 311 N.C. 679, 319
S.E.2d 139 (1984).
21. Speck, 64 N.C. App. at 431, 307 S.E.2d at 793.
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to the plaintiffs with regard to the process."'2 2 The court, after analyzing the
rights of employees to their inventions, categorized Speck and Gilliland as "per-
sons hired to invent" who therefore had no right to inventions arising from their
research.
The North Carolina Supreme Court embarked upon this path on its own
initiative. Of the ten cases cited in the majority opinion, only three were cited in
the parties' briefs. None of the numerous cases cited by the court of appeals was
even mentioned by the supreme court. Because of the nature of the summary
judgment motion, only limited facts had been presented at trial concerning
Speck's status as a person hired to invent. It was therefore unusual for the
supreme court to allow the case to turn on the rights of the employed inventor.
If the issue had been presented properly at the trial level and before the court of
appeals, not only would additional facts concerning the context and nature of
Speck and Gilliland's employment have come to light, but in all likelihood the
court would have been presented with a more developed discussion of the issue
whether faculty members should be classified as persons hired to invent.
An employee's claim for compensation for an inventive idea usually is
based upon the unjust enrichment of the employer and therefore is a question of
state contract law. Although patent infringement is governed by federal stat-
ute,23 state law governs whether the employee has impliedly or explicitly as-
signed an inventive idea to the employer. 24 Trade secret protection, however, is
entirely a product of state common law. 25 In Speck the court failed to distin-
22. Speck, 311 N.C. at 685, 319 S.E.2d at 143.
23. The Patent Act provides for the inventor's exclusive right to market and use any product or
process that is appropriately filed with the patent office. This right is limited to a maximum of 17
years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id. § 101. The Patent Act
also establishes a civil action for damages as the inventor's remedy against infringement. Id. §§ 271,
281.
Trademark and copyright infringement also are governed by federal statute. A trademark is a
mark of authenticity used to distinguish a manufacturer's products from those of another. Elgin
Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 673 (1901) ("The term has been in use
from a very early date, and, generally speaking, means a distinctive mark of authenticity, through
which the products of particular manufacturers. . . may be distinguished from those of others.");
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (5th ed. 1979). Federal statutes provide for injunctions, recovery
of damages, and destruction of infringing goods when the original trademark is properly registered
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1116-18 (1982).
Copyright protection is extended to literary material and the like, with civil and criminal ac-
tions available for infringement. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 501-509 (1982).
24. Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1929); Standard Brands, Inc.
v. United States Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp. 161, 176 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
25. Engelhard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 352-53 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953).
A trade secret is based upon a confidential relationship. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co.
v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). As defined by the American Law Institute, a trade secret is
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business,
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it. . . . An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible. Some factors to
be considered in determining whether given information is one's trade secret are: (1) the
extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it
is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken
by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and
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guish plaintiffs' claim for compensation for use of a trademark from a claim for
use of a patent. Although the opinion refers to the improved medium for grow-
ing lactobacillus acidophilus as a "secret process" (implying similarity to both
trade secrets and patents), the court applied both patent and trade secret law by
analogy. The hired-to-invent doctrine is common to patent,26 trade secret, 27
copyright,28 and other similar claims.29 The North Carolina Supreme Court in
Speck properly recognized, however, as does the greater weight of authority,
that an employee's right to compensation for use of an invention should be de-
termined without regard to the patentability of the invention.
30
The United States Supreme Court in Solomons v. United States3 1 recog-
nized that an employee hired to invent has no property rights in his own inven-
tive ideas: "If one is employed to devise or perfect an instrument . . . , he
cannot, after successfully accomplishing the work for which he was employed,
plead title thereto as against his employer. That which he has been employed
and paid to accomplish becomes. . . the property of the employer."' 32 In Stan-
dard Parts Co. v. Peck,33 the Court held that an employee under a general em-
ployment contract who is later assigned to pursue a project of developing a
particular process or machinery has no property rights to inventions related to
that project or process.34 This point was further clarified by the United States
his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the
information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly ac-
quired or duplicated by others.
REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). Due to the development of the fields of unfair
competition and trade regulation during the 40 years after the formulation of the first Restatement of
Torts, the provisions pertaining to trade secrets were eliminated from the second Restatement. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 708-761 introductory note (1977). For examples of modem
courts citing the first Restatement, see Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 623-
24 (7th Cir. 1971); Demit of Venezuela, C.A. v. Electronic Water Sys., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 850, 852
(S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd mem., 740 F.2d 977 (1lth Cir. 1984) (quoting Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C &
P Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55, 74 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing
Restatement)); International Election Sys. Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp 684, 705-06 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
aff'd mem, 595 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1979).
26. See Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426,435 (1896); McAleer v. United States, 150 U.S. 424,
430-31 (1893); Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890).
27. Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 120 N.H. 626, 629-30, 419 A.2d 1115, 1117 (1980).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
29. Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 270 Cal. App. 2d 886, 890, 76 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108
(1969) (alluding to doctrine in discussion of "cutting" and "editing" rights in motion pictures).
30. "Nearly all of the cases agree that relief in respect of a defendant's use or disclosure of a
secret invention, discovery, etc., is to be granted, or withheld, without regard to questions of patenta-
bility." Annot., 170 A.L.R. 481 (1947) (citing cases); see also Wilson v. Barton & Ludwig, Inc., 163
Ga. App. 721, 296 S.E.2d 74 (1982) (The court recognized that an employee could recover compen-
sation for an employer's use of an unpatentable idea or product based on implied contract. The
court, however, concluded the employee's idea was not sufficiently novel so as to constitute a pro-
tectable interest.); Dewey v. American Stair Glide Corp., 557 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(claim for compensation analyzed under shop-right doctrine despite failure to file for patent; inven-
tion referred to as "novel idea"); Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 120 N.H. 626, 419 A.2d 1115 (1980) (In
employer's suit seeking to enjoin employee from working for competitor, court applied shop-right
and hired-to-invent doctrine to unpatented device created by employee that was similar to trade
secret.).
31. 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
32. Id. at 346.
33. 264 U.S. 52 (1924).
34. Id. at 58-60.
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Houghton v. United States.35 "The
right of the employer to the invention or discovery of the employee depends, not
upon the terms of the original contract of hiring, but upon the nature of the
service in which the employee is engaged at the time he makes the discovery or
invention .... -36 The hired-to-invent doctrine is firmly established,37 but
courts have differed in the application of the doctrine. Generally, an employee is
classified as one hired to invent only when there exists clear evidence of such a
situation. "Courts. . . are reluctant to find a specifically-inventive employment
agreement. They distinguish between employees hired to invent and those hired
merely to improve the embodiment of an idea."
38
An employer acquires an implied license to use the employee's inventive
ideas-a shop right-when the employee uses his work time or the employer's
materials to reduce his idea to practice. 39 The rationale for granting a shop
right was articulated in United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. 4
Since the servant uses his master's time, facilities and materials to at-
tain a concrete result, the latter is in equity entitled to use that which
embodies his own property and to duplicate it as often as he may find
occasion to employ similar appliances in his business. But the em-
ployer in such a case has no equity to demand a conveyance of the
invention, which is the original conception of the employee alone
41
An employer's shop right is personal to the employer and cannot be assigned to
35. 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928).
36. Id. at 390.
37. See Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426, 435 (1896); McAleer v. United States, 150 U.S. 424,
430-31 (1893); Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890); Houghton v. United States, 23
F.2d 386, 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928); Bandag, Inc. v. Morenings, 259 Iowa 998,
1005, 146 N.W.2d 916, 921 (1966); National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 247, 55 N.E.2d 783,
787 (1944); Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 162-63, 131
N.E. 307, 308 (1921); Steranko v. Inforex, Inc., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 269-70, 362 N.E.2d 222, 233-
34 (1977); International Pulverizing Corp. v. Kidwel, 7 N.J. Super. 345, 347, 71 A.2d 151, 151 (Ch.
Div. 1950).
38. Note, Patent Ownership: An Employer's Rights To His Employee's Invention, 58 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 863, 867 (1983). For an example of a court's reluctance to classify an employee as a
person hired to invent, see Logus Mfg. Corp. v. Nelson, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566, 568 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (court held that vice-president hired to direct development of microwave products not hired to
invent).
39. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933); Kinkade v. New York
Shipbuilding Corp., 21 N.J. 362, 371, 122 A.2d 360, 365 (1956); Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 298,
157 N.E.2d 505, 509, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348, 353-55 (1959); see also Aero Bolt & Screw Co. v. Iaia, 180
Cal. App. 2d 728, 736-39, 5 Cal. Rptr. 53, 58-60 (1960) (shop right not granted for invention that
was created on employee's own time at his own expense); Brown v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration
Co., 374 A.2d 842, 847 (Del. Ch. 1977) (court recognized shop-right doctrine, but concluded doc-
trine was not applicable because of existence of express contract), rev'd on other grounds, 403 A.2d
1114 (Del. 1979); Dewey v. American Stair Glide Corp., 557 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(shop right not granted because use of employer's materials was de minimis); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2D
374-76 (1958) (collecting cases).
40. 289 U.S. 178 (1933). Dubilier is the seminal case delineating the rights of employees to
inventions created during employment. The United States Supreme Court held that two employees
of the United States Bureau of Standards who had conducted research in the use of radio remote
control would be required to grant a shop right in a radio receiving set they had invented. Id. at 185-
86, 193.
41. Id. at 188-89.
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a third person,42 except to a successor corporation.43
When the employee is under a general contract of employment-a person
not hired to invent-and the invention is not developed with the use of the em-
ployer's resources, the employee retains full rights to the invention. 44 The em-
ployee retains these rights even if the invention is related to the employer's
product line.
45
These classifications of employees were summarized by the United States
Supreme Court in Dubilier.
One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of
service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer
any patent obtained. The reason is that he has only produced that
which he was hired to invent.. . . On the other hand, if the employ-
ment be general, albeit it cover a field of labor and effort in the per-
formance of which the employee conceived the invention for which he
obtained a patent, the contract is not so broadly construed as to re-
quire an assignment of the patent.
[W]here a servant, during his hours of employment, working
with his master's materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an
invention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his master a
nonexclusive right to practice the invention.
46
The Florida Supreme Court has examined two cases involving the rights of
employees to inventive ideas associated with institutional research. In State
Board of Education v. Bourne4 7 the court upheld an employee's right to his
inventions. Bourne was employed as a member of the research staff of the Ever-
glades Experiment Station on a project attempting to develop new strains of
sugar cane. 48 At trial the chancellor determined that Bourne was hired as a
plant pathologist and physiologist, but not as a geneticist. 49 The chancellor held
that the nature of Bourne's employment did not contemplate invention of these
strains; thus, Bourne was not hired to invent. The Supreme Court of Florida
upheld the chancellor's determination because the employment contract "by ex-
press terms or unequivocal inference" did not show that Bourne was hired to
invent.50 Lacking such evidence, the employment was deemed to be of a general
nature.51 Although Bourne was part of a project researching new plant vari-
eties, unless his individual inventive capacities were employed specifically for the
42. Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52, 54 (1924); Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233
(1886); Francklyn v. Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158, 1160-62 (9th Cir. 1983); PPG Indus. V.
Guardian Indus., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093-94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 930 (1979).
43. Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793, 796 (W.D. Pa. 1931).
44. Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315, 320 (1893).
45. Mainland Indus. v. Timberland Machines & Eng'g Corp., 58 Or. App. 585, 589, 649 P.2d
613, 616, appeal denied, 293 Or. 801, 653 P.2d 999 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
46. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 187-88.
47. 150 Fla. 323, 7 So. 2d 838 (1942).
48. Id. at 324, 7 So. 2d at 839.
49. Id. at 325, 7 So. 2d at 839.




purpose of deriving such strains he would not be considered a person hired to
invent. The court recognized that an individual employed for the purpose of
conducting research does not lose the rights to his inventive ideas unless he is
assigned to a specific project from which the employer expects to derive a patent
or trade secret.
5 2
In State v. Neal53 the Supreme Court of Florida heard the appeal of an-
other employee of the Experiment Station who claimed rights to his research. In
Neal the court found additional facts supporting a finding that the employee was
hired to invent. The rationale of Bourne, however, was left intact with only
slight modification. Dr. Wayne Neal, an assistant in animal nutrition at the
Experiment Station, was assigned to a project that was to examine the digestibil-
ity of dried citrus waste among livestock.5 4 The project later was modified to
include the development of dried citrus waste as a dairy feed. 55 Neal, as director
of the project, applied for a patent for such a dairy feed in the name of the
Experiment Station. 56 Upon being informed that a patent could be issued only
in the name of an individual, Neal applied for the patent in his own name.
57
Neal later assigned the patent, which resulted in litigation between the State and
the assignee.58 In determining that there was an "unequivocal inference" that
Neal was hired to invent, the court pointed to his responsibility for directing the
project, the payment of patent expenses by the Station, and Neal's intention of
obtaining the patent in the name of his employer.5 9 The only modification of the
Bourne ruling appears to be that an "unequivocal inference" that an employee
was hired to invent need not arise from the express wording of the employment
contract, but may arise from subsequent conditions. That Neal cites Bourne
with approval supports this conclusion. 60
In Kaplan v. Johnson6 1 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois was faced with the question whether the government had
acquired all interests in a whole-body imaging system developed by the Chief of
the Nuclear Medicine Services at a Veterans Administration hospital. Plaintiff
acknowledged that during the development of this invention he had made use of
his employer's facilities and equipment and the services of other employees.
62
The court addressed the ownership of inventions created in connection with an
employer's research:
52. Id. at 329, 7 So. 2d at 840.
53. 152 Fla. 582, 12 So. 2d 590, cerL denied, 320 U.S. 783 (1943).
54. Id. at 583-84, 12 So. 2d at 590.
55. Id. at 584, 12 So. 2d at 590.
56. Id. at 584, 12 So. 2d at 590-91.
57. Id. at 584, 12 So. 2d at 590.
58. Id. at 584, 12 So. 2d at 590-91.
59. Id. at 585-86, 12 So. 2d at 591.
60. Id. at 587, 12 So. 2d at 592 ("Mhe invention in question was the product of Dr. Neal's
contract of employment and. . . under the rule announced in State Board of Education v. Bourne,
. . . it enured to his employer.").
61. 409 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd sub nom. Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir.
1976).
62. Id. at 193.
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The government .. argues that the invention related to [Kaplan's]
official duties. This argument is based upon [a] letter ... indicating
that plaintiff was expected to engage in research. . . In Dubilier, the
Court did not consider either the performance or the supervision of
research to be an absolutely critical factor. ... It is readily apparent
that the Court desired to draw a distinction between employment call-
ing for general research work and employment with the specific objec-
tive of invention. The Court held that even if an employee receives a
general research assignment and ultimately invents a patented process
or machine, he will not be required to assign his rights to the patent
absent an express agreement or assignment to invent. The Court held
this to be true even if the contract of employment covers a field of
endeavor to which the invention relates.
63
The district court also considered the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 10096, which directs that any government employee who creates an inven-
tion during worlk hours or with government contribution of facilities, material,
or funds must assign all rights to the government. 64 After finding the order
unconstitutional, the court found in favor of plaintiff, granting only a shop right
to the government. 65 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, holding the executive order constitutional, and granted the gov-
ernment full rights to the patent.
66
The ownership of literary property developed by a university professor has
been considered by the California Court of Appeals. In Williams v. Weisser67 a
college professor was awarded damages based on property rights in lectures de-
livered at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). Defendant
Weisser had paid graduate students to audit Williams' class and prepare summa-
ries of his lectures. These notes then were sold to students. Defendant asserted
that any rights to the lectures were held by the university, which was not a party
to the suit. The court noted that UCLA was incapable of prescribing Wil-
liams' "way of expressing the ideas he puts before his students." 68 This lack of
control refuted defendant's contention that Williams was hired to produce these
specific lectures. The court also noted that if Williams did not hold property
rights to his lectures, the university could enjoin him from teaching similar
courses at other schools in the future. The university, however, had not
purchased Williams' every thought by virtue of the employment contract.
Despite the holdings in other jurisdictions that an employee assigned to
perform general institutional research is not a person hired to invent, the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Speck categorized faculty researchers as persons
hired to invent. The strongest reasoning supporting this classification was ex-
pressed in Houghton v. United States.
69
63. Id. at 200.
64. Id. at 203-06.
65. Id. at 206.
66. Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1976).
67. 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1969).
68. Id. at 734, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
69. 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir), cert denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928).
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Let a case be supposed of a charitable foundation, which employs
chemists and physicians to study diseases, with a view of discovering a
cure for them, one of whose employees, in the course of experiments
conducted for it, discovers a remedy which it is seeking, and for the
discovery of which the experiments are conducted, and procures a pat-
ent on it. Should such employee be allowed to withhold the patent
from the foundation for his own profit, merely because the foundation
does not desire to monopolize the remedy but to give the benefit of the
discovery to mankind?
70
Preserving the interests of an employer that has expended resources in develop-
ing a particular inventive idea is the foundation of the hired-to-invent doctrine.
"[W]hen an employee merely does what he is hired to do, his successes, as well
as failures, belong to his employer."'7 1 When an employee pursues a particular
discovery on behalf of the employer, there is no reason to distinguish the prod-
ucts of an employee's inventive skills and the products of his mechanical skills;
both are property of the employer. 72 The Restatement (Second) of Agency
73
finds this rationale particularly appropriate when applied to persons assigned to
experimental work. The Restatement would create an inference of ownership in
the employer when a person is hired to conduct "experimental work for inven-
tive purposes." 74 Finally, a court cannot but notice the vast amounts spent by
universities on research. A court determining ownership rights to university re-
search naturally would be inclined to find that the university has acquired all
rights to the knowledge it has paid to attain.
Although the common law has recognized a shop right when the inventive
idea is reduced to practice with the employer's resources or during hours of
employment, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Speck did not use these fac-
tors to determine the existence of a shop right. Instead, these factors were cited
as support for the determination whether the employee was hired to invent. Af-
ter noting that the secret process was developed during hours of employment
and with university resources, the court stated: "Under these facts, the secret
process developed through research of the plaintiffs belonged to the University
absent a written contract by the University to assign."'75 Although other courts
have shown reluctance in classifying persons as hired to invent because of the
risk of implying too much within the employment contract,76 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has categorically found that university faculty conducting
research are persons hired to invent.
In Speck, the court also noted the nature of NCSU as an institution pro-
70. Id. at 390.
71. Id.
72. Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426, 436 (1896).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 397 (1957).
74. Id. comment a.
75. Speck, 311 N.C. at 686, 319 S.E.2d at 143.
76. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. This is particularly true in the area of trade
secrets. Legal scholars have emphasized that courts should deny protection of a trade secret if the
job skills of the employee are such that "he will have difficulty in obtaining a new position if he
cannot take [the trade secret] with him." Note, Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. RIV. 888, 949
(1964).
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moting research for the common good.77 The court's holding in favor of NCSU,
however, does not necessarily promote the public good. The United States Con-
stitution created the patent system upon the theory that placing limited exclu-
sive rights in the inventor would create incentives to pursue inventive ideas and
enhance the development of technology.78 Courts have refrained from frustrat-
ing this policy. As the Supreme Court noted in Dubilier, "[T]he courts are in-
competent to answer the difficult question whether the patentee is to be...
compelled to dedicate his invention to the public. . . . [A]ny such declaration
of policy must come from Congress. .... ,,79
Academic research is fundamentally different from research conducted by
private industry. Although private industry pursues research and development
to attain practical applications capable of generating revenue, universities pursue
research to attain intellectual enlightenment. For this reason, university re-
search is more adequately characterized as "general research" than as "employ-
ment with the specific objective of invention." Teaching is the primary
responsibility of professors; their research is conducted to enhance the univer-
sity's position as an institution designed to convey knowledge. Professors, there-
fore, are allowed to research whatever problems their minds move them to
pursue. One avenue of research may be abandoned at will and another begun,
without reflection upon economic consequences and without any consultation
with university officials. The United States Supreme Court consistently has rec-
ognized the necessity of pursuing scholarship in a free and open environment.
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities
is almost self-evident. . . . To impose any strait jacket upon the intel-
lectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future
of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended
by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. . . Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die.
80
In contrast to the free pursuit of knowledge stands the Speck court's as-
sumption that university professors are hired to pursue specific research from
which they are expected to produce patentable inventions. Although university
faculty may be encouraged to research or publish, the goal of the university is
not to achieve marketable inventions. "[U]niversity personnel, as compared
with those in a commercial organization, are employed and promoted on a basis
which gives no recognition to the [economic] value of the inventions they
make."81 One court has held that when an employer is disinterested in whether
an employee produces an invention, that employee is not a person hired to
invent.82
77. Speck, 311 N.C. at 688, 319 S.E.2d at 145.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
79. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 208-09.
80. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
81. Caruso, UNIvERsrTY PATENT POLICIEs, 3 C. Couns. 64, 65-66 (1968).
82. Bowers v. Woodman, 59 F.2d 797 (D. Mass. 1932). In Bowers, the court held that an
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The common-law rights of ownership with regard to employed inventors
have developed from common expectations concerning employment. The com-
mon expectations concerning university employment are not the same as the
expectations concerning employees within private industry. University faculty
are not hired to produce commercially successful inventions; they are hired as
teachers and educators. Unlike the typical hired-to-invent situation in which the
acorn of an inventive idea is planted by the employer, patentable inventions aris-
ing from university research are results of the individual work of faculty who
chose to pursue such research. That professors are encouraged to pursue knowl-
edge by means of research should not be a basis for claiming that a professor
who engages in such research is hired to invent.
It is regrettable that the North Carolina Supreme Court classified university
employees as persons hired to invent without the issue being properly before the
court. Because plaintiffs used university resources, NCSU should have been af-
forded a shop right. Speck and Gilliland, however, should not have been de-
prived of all interests in the process they developed. If NCSU had considered
Speck's work to be of such importance in improving public health as to require
full ownership by the university, it should have taken measures to establish that
interest. The university should have the responsibility and obligation to deline-
ate, by means of the employment contract, the rights of employees to patents
derived from educational research.
CHRISTOPHER GRAFFLIN BROWNING, JR.
employee's assignment to study operations at various plants and to suggest improvements did not
anticipate that the employee would be required to invent. "If he had never invented anything, he
could not have been charged with a failure in the performance of his duties .... [T]here is, in this
case, no contract to invent." Id. at 802. This same disinterest characterizes universities' attitudes
toward faculty inventions. "mhe research of university faculty members is not directed by others
into channels where its purpose is a solution of specific technological problems. Rather, it is pure or
basic research which is undirected in the sense that areas of natural phenomena are explored primar-
ily for the purpose of adding to the store of knowledge." Caruso, supra note 81, at 64.
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